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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction and judgment against 
Daniel B. Northrup for Possession of a Controlled Substance with 
Intent to Distribute and Unlawful Distribution for Value of a 
Controlled Substance, felonies under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 
(1953 as amended)j also a misdemeanor conviction of Possession 
of a Controlled Substance. Defendant was found guilty of the 
above offenses after a bench trial on March 6, 1986, in the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Philip Fishier, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A motion to suppress was made by defendant Northrup and 
a hearing was held on January 7, 1986. Following the hearing, 
the judge made the following findings of fact: 
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"... that on the 26th of February, 1985, at 444 South 
970 East, also known as Garden Avenue...at about noon or 
1 P.M., Officers Beglarian and Rickards conferred with a Mr. 
Van Hoiten; gave Mr. Van Hoiten $1,000; and Mr. Van Hoiten then 
went into the address, ... [and] returned with ... cocaine. 
"That thereafter the person later determined to be Mr. 
Varney left the residence and he was subsequently stopped, and 
the officers determined that Mr. Varney did not have in his 
possession the $1,000. The officers at that point in time had 
probable cause to believe that a person or persons, one of whom 
may have been Dan Banks, was dealing in cocaine in the home in 
question. 
"... they went to the door [of the home], identified 
themselves as police officers; [and then] forced their way into 
the home. 
"... [A warrant arrived] at about 3 or 4:00 that after-
noon [to search the home]. ... I'm going to find that based 
upon the information that the officers had, which included knowledge 
that the money went into the house, the cocaine came out of the 
house, that two prior cocaine (quote) buys (unquote) had gone 
down in the area of the house ... allowed them to search the home. 
... I'm finding basically that the government could have secured 
the home, could have entered the home and then secured it from 
the outside, and then obtained a warrant and searched the home 
and obtained the very same thing. 
"I'm specifically finding that the actual entry to 
the home was proper because ... exigent circumstances were that 
as soon as people start coming and going from the home, they 
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would have to stop, arrest and search every one coming out of the 
home to look for money[.] 
"... The search of the persons I'm going to find to 
be proper. They had two choices. They could hold everybody 
there and wait for the warrant for these people, a warrant to 
search these people, or they could search the people or they could 
let the people go. (R. at 84-87)" 
On examination, the officers stated that they entered 
the premises to retrieve the money they felt was in the house. 
(R. at 128) They were unsure who had the money, so they 
arrested the five occupants of the house and searched them and 
found $1,000 on appellant. After finding the money on appellant, 
and having arrested him and after having put a gun on him, 
appellant agreed to show the officers some things in his room, 
but only after having been promised that they would go easy on 
him if he did cooperate. (£. at 137) Those items were used in 
evidence against appellant at trial. 
The arresting officer testified at trial that after 
arresting appellant and four others for possession of a controlled 
substance with an intent to distribute, they discovered the 
marked $1,000 in a search incident to the arrest and not during 
the initial pat-down of appellant (Trial transcript at 890, 
Record at 135). At the suppression hearing, they hinted it was 
discovered during a frisk of appellant. (R at 166) 
Appellant was convicted based upon evidence admitted 
by the court obtained from the entry into the Northrup home. 
The evidence used against Northrup consisted almost 
exclusively of items secured prior to the arrival of the warrant. 
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The probable cause for obtaining the warrant came from 
information obtained after entry into the home. (Exhibit 1, 
R. 130-132) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
POLICE HAD NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST PRIOR TO ENTRY 
Before entry of a private residence for the purposes 
of making an arrest, quite obviously, the entry is not lawful 
unless the police had grounds to arrest. Fisher v. Volz, 
496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974). In this case, the police did not 
know who perpetrated the crime because Mark VanHolten did not 
inform them which individual was responsible for the sale of the 
drugs. Thus they had no probable cause to make an arrest of any 
particular individual. The police had no reason to know which 
person to arrest. 
POINT 2 
A WARRANTLESS ENTRY WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE NOT PRESENT 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Coolidge vs. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443 (1971) , stated that the warrantless entry inside a 
man's house is per se unreasonable in the absence of some one of 
a number of well defined "exigent circumstances." Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Court added, "... certainly 
stands by negative implicabion for the proposition that an arrest 
warrant is required in the absence of exigent circumstances." 
Coolidge cited Dorman vs. United States, 435 F.2d 
385 (D.C. Circ. 1970), where Judge Leventhal, for the majority, 
concluded the general rule is that a warrant is ordinarily 
required "not only in case of entry to search for property, 
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but also in case of entry to arrest a suspect," but found that 
exceptional circumstances were present in this case which justified 
a warrantless entry. He then proceeded to list the considerations 
material to that conclusion: 
"First, that a grave offense is involved, particularly 
one that is a crime of violence. * * * 
"Second, * * * that the suspect is reasonably believed 
to be armed. * * * 
"Third, that there exists not merely the minimum of 
probable cause that is requisite even when a warrant has been 
issued, but beyond that, a clear showing or probable cause, 
including 'reasonable trustworthy information,1 to believe that the 
suspect committed the crime involved. 
"Fourth, strong reason to believe that the suspect is 
in the premises being entered. 
"Fifth, a likelihood that the suspect will escape if 
not swiftly apprehended. 
"Sixth, the circumstance that the entry, though not 
consented, is made peaceably." 
In this case, the offense involved is not a crime of 
violence, and there was no reason to believe the suspects were 
armed. In fact, there were numerous vehicles in front of the 
house. They arrested five individuals, and then made their case. 
In fact, there is no information upon which they knew 
who was a suspect. Several individuals were in the home and the 
police had no idea, let alone probable cause to believe any one 
individual inside coramitted the offense over any other individual 
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in the home who was male. There is no showing or probable cause 
including "reasonable trustworthy information" to believe who 
committed the crime involved. 
The circumstances through which the police entered 
were anything but peaceable, and they had drawn weapons when they 
first knocked at the door. 
Part of the definition of exigency as defined by Black's 
law dictionary is: an imperativeness or an unforeseen occurrence 
or condition; pressing need or demand, et cetera. In this case, 
none of the conduct of defendants was unforeseen nor unexpected 
and there was no reason the police could not have done more to 
find a suspect short of a violent intrusion into the defendant's 
home. 
The police entered to retrieve their money without a 
warrant. (R. at 128) They weren't sure who had the money. A 
possible loss of money should not be considered an exigent 
circumstance. The police voluntarily parted with their money. 
POINT 3 
THE POLICE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED THE PERSON OF NORTHRUP 
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) , the United 
States Supreme Court held that the police can only frisk a 
person if they believe that person to be armed and dangerous. 
If a person is believed to be armed and dangerous, the police 
can only search the outer clothing of a person for items which 
could be weapons. The police had no reason to believe though 
that the defendant Northrup was armed and dangerous. Even if 
the police thought that the defendant Northrup was armed and 
dangerous, the police could not take nor remove evidence unless 
they had reason to believe it to be a dangerous weapon under 
6 
State v. O'Neal, 444 P.2d 951 (1968). The police took from 
defendant Northrup money from a pocket by itself. Clearly, 
with a pat-down, a police officer can tell that an object that 
feels like money is not a weapon. At the very most, they are 
allowed to frisk for weapons and to do further is an unreasonable 
search. It is not more probable than not that defendant Northrup 
would have the money versus anyone else in the house. To conduct 
a search of more than a frisk would be unwarranted. 
The arresting officer testified at trial that after 
arresting appellant and four others for possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, he discovered the marked 
bills in a search incident to his arrest and not during the 
initial pat-down of appellant. 
The retrieval of the money was thus taken in violation 
of appellant's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
POINT 4 
THERE WAS NO CONSENT TO A SEARCH 
According to State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 10 3 
(Utah 1980), the prosecution has the burden of establishing 
from the totality of the circumstances that a consent to search 
is voluntary; factors to be looked at to show a lack of duress 
or coercion in obtaining consent include: the absence of a claim 
of authority to search by the officers; the absence of an 
exhibition of force by the officers, a mere request to search, 
cooperation by the owner of the object to be searched, and the 
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officers. 
In this case, the officers were refused admittance to 
the house and then took guns and put them near the head of 
Northrup, and made him lie on the floor. Although whatever 
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they subsequently obtained would be in violation of the 
poisonous tree doctrine, they told Northrup they would be easy 
on him if he showed them some things in his room as they held a 
weapon close to his head. (R. at 137) This shows duress and 
coercion. 
POINT 5 
ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE HOUSE 
WAS FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE 
Suppression of fruit of an illegal search and seizure 
has been mandated to purge the taint of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 1963. In this 
case, the combination of factors gives rise to meritorious 
issues which should be decided by the appellate court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant Daniel B. 
Northrup, asks this Court to reverse his convictions and remand 
this case to the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted this ) \ , day of May, 1987. 
?..,K/ * {„^^// 
DAVID L. GRINDSTAFF */ 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
Daniel B. Northrup 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUITcoURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace o f f i c e r in the S t a t e of Utah. 
Proof by A f f i d a v i t under oa th having been made t h i s day be fore me by B r u c e 
Bennion , I am s a t i s f i e d t h a t there i s probable cause t o b e l i e v e 
That ( ) on the p e r s o n ( s ) of 
( ) i n the v e h i c l e (s) d e s c r i b e d as 
fc# on the premises known as 4 4 4 1 G a r d e n D s i v e , a w h i t e f r m a 
house with a red roof located a t approximately 4441 Snnt-1 
970 East _ _ 
In the City of S a l t Lake
 f C o u n t y o f S a l t Lake f 
State of Utah, there i s now being possessed or concealed certain p roper ty or 
evidence described as: 
"Narcotics paraphernalia consist ing of sca les , screens, mirrors , 
p l a s t i c bags, bongs, razor blades and pipes; and quan t i t i e s of 
marijuana, hashish, psilocybin mushrooms and approximately 10 
grams, more or l e s s , of cocaine" 
which property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or i s unlawfully possessed. 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public of fense . 
(x) i s being possessed with the purpose to use i t as a means of 
committing or concealing a public of fense . 
(x) c o n s i s t s of an item or const i tutes evidence of i l l e g a l conduct, 
possessed by a party to the i l l e g a l conduct. 
( ) i s evidence of i l l e g a l conduct in possess ion of a person or 
e n t i t y not a party to the i l l e g a l conduct and good cause being 
shown that the s e i zu re cannot be obtained by subpoena WJ thoul 
the evidence being concealed, des t royed, damaged, or a l t e r e d . 
(Conditions for service of t h i s warrant are included or a t tached 
hereto . ) 
You are therefore commanded: 
( ) in the day time 
(x) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown) 
( ) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof 
under oath being shown that the object of this search may 
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may result 
to any person if notice were given) 
Q 
PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and 
pn mi i.e. for the* herein-above described property or evidence and if you find 
the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth 
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such pro-
perty in your custody, subject to the order of this court, 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this ^ 0? day of Februar^ , 19 85 , 
/ / 
JUDGE, JUSTICE OP" THE PEACE, OR 
MAGISTRATE OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
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